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Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of
Children & Family Services:
Florida's Gay Adoption Ban Under
Irrational Equal Protection Analysis
Christopher D. Jozwiak"
The Constitution cannot be interpreted.., to tolerate the
imposition by government upon the rest of us of white
suburbia's preference in patterns of family living.1
Introduction
Amidst a President calling for an amendment that would
write discrimination against gays and lesbians into the
Constitution, 2 a U.S. Supreme Court legitimizing the privacy
rights of gays and lesbians, 3 and a state supreme court legalizing
gay "marriage" rather than a civil union substitute, 4 gays and
lesbians find themselves in an uncertain, distinct, and historic
moment. In Florida, a single gay man or woman cannot adopt a
child, whereas a single heterosexual man or woman can.5 Florida
is the only state in the union that categorically disqualifies
otherwise eligible gay men and lesbians from the adoption
process. 6 In 1999, Steven Lofton and other gay and lesbian
* J.D. expected 2006, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2000, cum laude,
Macalester College. Thank you to the editors and staff of this journal for their
work, especially Jonathan Krieger for his astute editing. Thank you to Steven
Lofton and his partner Roger Croteau for having the courage and patience to fight
for their parental rights. Thank you to Professors Dale Carpenter and Judith T.
Younger for their thoughts and support. Finally, thank you to my partner Anders
for his love and consistent thoughtfulness.
1. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 508 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
2. See Remarks Calling for a Constitutional Amendment Defining and
Protecting Marriage, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 276, 277 (Feb. 24, 2004).
3. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
4. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003).
5. See infra Part II.
6. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3 n.3, Lofton v. Sec'y of the Fla. Dep't
of Children & Families, 2004 WL 2289198 (U.S.) (No. 04-478) (explaining that
Mississippi prohibits adoptions by gay and lesbian couples and Arkansas excludes
gay household members from serving as foster parents, but that Florida is the only
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individuals denied the chance to adopt challenged the ban in
federal district court, to no avail. 7 The plaintiffs appealed and, in
Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children & Family
Services,8 the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld the
state's ban.9  A good portion of the opinion responds to the
appellants' allegation that the state's ban is a denial of substantive
due process.' 0 Although the due process analysis that the court
espouses is certainly ripe for criticism, the focus of this Article is
instead on the court's conclusion that the adoption ban does not
constitute a denial of the equal protection of the law."
The court in Lofton held that Florida's blanket ban on gay
adoption is constitutional because "there are plausible.., reasons
for the disparate treatment of homosexuals and heterosexual
singles,"'12 and the "legislative choice to treat foster care and
guardianships differently than adoption.., is not an irrational
one." Rejecting these assertions, this Article argues that the
Eleventh Circuit should have invalidated the statute on equal
protection grounds because it does not survive rational basis
review. The statute is nothing more than an instance of animus
directed at a classification of persons and is therefore
unconstitutional.
Importantly, the Supreme Court recently denied the petition
for certiorari that Steven Lofton and appellants brought in 2004.14
The petition was denied without comment, although some argue
the current political culture is too rife with emotional turmoil over
gay rights issues for the Court to lay down any ruling.15
Practically, the denial of certiorari means gays and lesbians will
continue to be categorically denied participation in adoption
state to categorically exclude homosexuals from single parent adoption).
7. See Lofton v. Kearney, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1375-76, 1385 (S.D. Fla. 2001),
aff'd, 358 F.3d 804 (lth Cir. 2004). The plaintiffs also included one of Lofton's
foster children. See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
8. 358 F.3d 804 (lth Cir. 2004), reh'g en banc denied, 377 F.3d 1275 (11th
Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005).
9. Id. at 820-23.
10. See id. at 811-20.
11. See id. at 817-27.
12. Id. at 823.
13. Id. at 824.
14. Lofton v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Children & Families, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005)
(mem.); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Lofton v. Sec'y of the Fla. Dep't of Children
& Families, 2004 WL 2289198 (U.S.) (No. 04-478).
15. See Charles Lane, Gay-Adoption Ban in Florida to Stand, WASH. POST, Jan.
11, 2005, at A4.
[Vol. 23:407
LOFTON v. SEC'Y OF DCFS
procedures in Florida. 16 By refusing to hear the case, the Supreme
Court has allowed the foster children of gay families in Florida to
remain in limbo, without a sense of the permanency or a feeling of
what is "home."17
The first part of this Article lays out the facts of Lofton and
provides the procedural history of the case.18 Second, this Article
examines Florida's adoption and foster care law affecting gays and
lesbians.1 9 The third part of this Article looks at the Equal
Protection Clause and its role in protecting the rights and
interests of gays and lesbians.20 Finally, this Article argues that
the Lofton court incorrectly determined that Florida's treatment of
gays and lesbians is not a denial of equal protection.21 Three
arguments are presented in order to demonstrate that Florida's
adoption law is unconstitutional: the law's disparate treatment of
homosexual and heterosexual singles is both underinclusive and
overinclusive; 22 Florida's inclusion of homosexuals in the foster
care system and simultaneous exclusion of them from adoption is
irrational;23 and the adoption law is directed at status, not
conduct. 24
1. Florida Denied Steven Lofton the Right to Adopt His
Foster Child Because Lofton Is Gay
Steven Lofton and his long-term partner, Roger Croteau, are
financially stable, model caregivers, and, most importantly, loving
parents to five foster children.25 Recently, Steven Lofton was
honored with the Outstanding Foster Parenting Award from a
local child placement agency. 26  His parenting is certainly
16. See Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Disappointed the
Supreme Court Will Not Hear an Appeal in Case Challenging Florida's Anti-Gay
Adoption Law (Jan. 10, 2005), http://www.aclu.org/LesbianGayRights (last visited
Feb. 7, 2005).
17. See id.
18. See infra Part I.
19. See infra Part II.
20. See infra Part III.
21. See infra Part IV.
22. See infra Part W.A.
23. See infra Part IV.B.
24. See infra Part IV.C.
25. See Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804,
807 (11th Cir. 2004) (praising Lofton for his parenting and claiming that by all
accounts Lofton's care of his foster children has been exemplary), reh'g en banc
denied, 377 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005).
26. Lofton v. Kearney, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1375 (S.D. Fla. 2001), aff'd, 358
F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004); see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10, Lofton v.
2005]
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commendable. At the time of the litigation, Lofton was a certified
long-term foster parent for three children, all diagnosed with HIV
at birth, and raised them while administering their medications
and tending to their illnesses.27 John Doe is one of the couple's
foster children, and he is named as a party in the litigation. 28 Doe
has been with Lofton and Croteau since birth.29 The state agency
responsible for foster care and adoption, the Department of
Children & Families (DCF), was well aware of Lofton's sexual
identity when he became Doe's foster parent, but since Florida
allows gays and lesbians to be foster parents, it was not an
impediment to the process. 30 .
In his infancy, Doe seroreverted and tested negative for
HIV.31 Doe's change in health put him in a position to be formally
adopted, and Lofton immediately tried to adopt his foster son.32
While filling out the adoption application, Lofton omitted to mark
the application box that asked him about his sexual orientation
and omitted information with regard to his cohabitating partner.33
DCF requested the information, but Lofton, knowing the
inevitable outcome, would not meet its requests. 34 Then the
agency, pursuant to chapter 63.042(3) of Florida Statutes, denied
the adoption application based on what it knew to be his sexual
identity.35 The provision states that "[n]o person eligible to adopt
under this statute may adopt if that person is a homosexual." 36
Steven Lofton and others similarly situated 37 sued the head
Sec'y of the Fla. Dep't of Children & Families, 2004 WL 2289198 (U.S.) (No. 04-478)
(highlighting the fact that the agency that placed the foster children with Lofton
and Croteau, the Children's Home Society, have since named the annual honor the
"Lofton-Croteau" award).
27. Kearney, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1375; see also Petition for Cert. at 8 (explaining
that since 1988 Lofton and Croteau have been foster parents to eight children with
either HIV or AIDS and that three of the children have been with them since they
were infants-they are now thirteen, sixteen, and seventeen and think of
themselves as brothers and sisters).
28. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 807 (panel).
29. Petition for Cert. at 8; Gail Epstein Nieves, U.S. Judge Upholds Florida's
Ban on Homosexual Adoptions, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 31, 2001, Lexis-Nexis.
30. See Kearney, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1375 n.3 (noting that a foster parent's
sexual identity is usually discussed either during the placement procedure or when
DCF conducts the many family visits that are required to maintain certification as
a foster parent).
31. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 807 (panel).
32. See id.
33. Id. at 808.
34. Id.
35. See Kearney, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1375 n.3.
36. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West Supp. 2005).
37. See Kearney, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1376 (noting that Douglas Houghton,
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of DCF, Kathleen Kearney. 38 In the complaint, the plaintiffs
claimed the treatment they received under the Florida statute
violated their right "to familial privacy, intimate association, and
family integrity protected by ... the Due Process Clause ... [and]
their rights to equal protection guaranteed by the 14th
Amendment."39 The district court rejected their claims.40 As to
the due process claim, the court found that since "there is no
fundamental right to adopt or to be adopted, there can be no
fundamental right to apply for adoption," and that the plaintiffs
"have no expectation of permanency and, therefore, no right to
exclude the State from their family lives." 41
As to the equal protection claim, the district court found that
since gays are not a suspect class, and the right to adopt a child is
not fundamental, the court would only examine whether the law
was rational.42 The court rejected one of the state's given reasons
for the legislation, which was to express its moral disapproval of
homosexuality, 43 but upheld the statute based on the state's
argument that the law served the best interests of Florida's
children. 44 Florida argued that it is best for children to have
married heterosexual parents in order to "provide proper gender
role modeling and to minimize social stigmatization."45 To the
plaintiffs' charge that this assertion was merely a pretext for
animus, the court responded that "[w]hether this reasoning in fact
underl[ies] the legislative decision is irrelevant."46 Finally, the
court asserted that the legislature should receive broad deference
if there is any conceivable basis for social policy decisions, that
"[h]omosexuals are not similar in all relevant aspects to other
nonmarried adults," and that because gays and lesbians cannot
Wayne Smith, and Daniel Skahen all sought adoption rights but were rejected on
the basis of their sexual identity and that three other plaintiffs were dismissed due
to lack of an actual injury).
38. Id. at 1375.
39. Id. at 1377.
40. See id. at 1378-85.
41. Id. at 1380.
42. See id. at 1380-85.
43. See id. at 1382-83. This explanation is mirrored in the statute's legislative
history. See Laura A. Turbe, Florida's Inconsistent Use of the Best Interests of the
Child Standard, 33 STETSON L. REV. 369, 376 (2003) (noting that the bill's sponsor
in the Florida Senate stated that the goal of the legislation was to send a message
to homosexuals that Florida is tired of them and wishes they would go back in the
closet).
44. See Kearney, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1383-85.




marry, they cannot meet the State's asserted interest.47
The plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit. 48 Although the arguments on appeal
essentially mirrored those made to the district court, the plaintiffs
due process argument was enhanced by the Supreme Court's
decision in Lawrence v. Texas,49 which struck down Texas's statute
criminalizing sodomy.50 Even with this added weight to the
plaintiffs' due process claim, the argument was not successful. 51
With respect to the equal protection claim, the Lofton panel
applied a deferential rational basis test, again finding that there
was no fundamental right at stake, and that "all of our sister
circuits that have considered the question [of whether or not gays
should receive heightened scrutiny] have declined to treat
homosexuals as a suspect class." 52 Accordingly, the court found
Florida's rationale that the ban on homosexual adoption is in the
best interests of the child was "one of those 'unprovable
assumptions' that nevertheless can provide a legitimate basis for
legislative action."53 The appellants argued that the statute is not
rationally related to its stated purpose. 54 The court disagreed on
all arguments, finding instead the disparate treatment of
homosexual and heterosexual singles within the statute to be
justifiable, 55 the disparate treatment of homosexuals within foster
care law and adoption law to be rational,5 and the discrimination
present in Florida's law not sweeping enough to show it was
47. Id. at 1385.
48. Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th
Cir. 2004), reh'g en banc denied, 377 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S.
Ct. 869 (2005).
49. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
50. Id. at 577-78; Lofton, 358 F.3d 809 (panel) (noting argument on appeal that
Florida ban violates sexual intimacy rights established under Lawrence).
51. See id. at 811-17. Scholars have criticized the court for underplaying the
significance of Lawrence in deciding the due process claim. See David L. Hudson,
Jr., Court Won't Tie Lawrence to Gay Adoption Law: 11th Circuit Rejects
Arguments by Florida Foster Parents, 3 A.B.A. J. EREPORT 1 (2004) (noting that the
Eleventh Circuit's decision was based on decisions that rely on Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186 (1986), which Lawrence overturned); Lofton v. Secretary of the
Department of Children and Family Services, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2791, 2796 (2004)
('The Lofton court wrongly evaluated Lawrence as if it formed a part of a
traditionalist ... substantive due process approach rather than on its own terms as
a replacement for that approach.").
52. See Lofton, 358 F.3d at 818 (panel).
53. Id. at 819-20.
54. Id. at 820.
55. See id. at 823.
56. See id. at 824.
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motivated by animus.57
When appellants applied for rehearing, the petition was
denied. 58 Judge Birch, who wrote the unanimous decision for the
panel,5 9 specially concurred in the denial, arguing that, under a
deferential form of rational basis analysis, Florida's ban on gay
adoption is a permissible legislative action and that Florida's
rationale is legitimate.60 In a blistering dissent, Judge Barkett
argued that Florida's law should be invalidated under both the
Equal Protection Clause and substantive due process doctrine, and
thus warranted en banc review. 61
II. Florida's Differential Treatment of Homosexuals Within
Foster Care and Adoption Procedures
In all proceedings related to children, Florida claims to
employ the best interests of the child standard.62 Florida uses this
standard in an effort to "provide for the care, safety, and protection
of children in an environment that fosters healthy social,
emotional, intellectual, and physical development.., and to
promote the health and well-being of all children under the state's
care."63 The state, however, applies this standard to homosexuals
in an inconsistent manner. Florida finds gay and lesbian parents
are in the best interests of children under foster care law and, at
the same time, claims gay and lesbian parents inherently are not
in the best interests of children under adoption law.
Steven Lofton was able to become John Doe's foster parent
because Florida does not discriminate against gays and lesbians
under the state's foster care law. The foster care system in Florida
57. See id. at 826.
58. Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 377 F.3d 1275,
1275 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005).
59. See Lofton, 358 F.3d at 806 (panel).
60. See Lofton, 377 F.3d at 1276 (Birch, J., specially concurring in denial of
rehearing en banc).
61. See id. at 1291 (Barkett, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
Two other judges concurred with Judge Barkett's conclusion regarding equal
protection analysis. See id. at 1290 (Anderson, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc). Another three judges also dissented, claiming there was a
"serious and substantial question" as to whether the statute could survive a
rational basis test. See id. at 1313 (Marcus, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing
en banc).
62. See Turbe, supra note 43, at 384 n.124. See generally Jodi L. Bell,
Prohibiting Adoption by Same-Sex Couples: Is It in the "Best Interests of the Child?"
49 DRAKE L. REV. 345, 357-58 (2001) (explaining the best interests of the child
standard).
63. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.001(1)(a) (West Supp. 2005) (listing purposes of laws
governing proceedings relating to children).
20051
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readily places children with gay and lesbian families, as long as
they meet the state standards for foster parenting.6 4 A prospective
foster family must be financially stable and able to provide food,
clothing, and education for the foster child.65 The foster family
must also be able to promote a child's health and well-being.66 All
foster parents undergo a screening, with an emphasis on whether
the applicant demonstrates good moral character. 67 With respect
to all of these standards, Florida's foster care system treats gays
and lesbians similar to straight applicants.6 8 Regardless of sexual
identity, the state "requires each foster parent to be qualified,
certified, and registered."69 By endorsing gay and lesbian families
as foster families, the state has "entrusted such individuals with
tremendous responsibility ... at a time that is crucial in the child's
life.' '70 Florida's placement of children in the foster homes of gays
and lesbians demonstrates the state's confidence that homosexual
families can serve the best interests of children.71
While Florida also uses the best interests standard in its
adoption law, the state applies the standard to gays and lesbians
differently than it does in foster care. 72 The provision in the
statute denying adoption rights to homosexuals prevents all gays
and lesbians from adopting, regardless of whether the placement
has already been determined to be in the child's best interests.7 3
Florida adoption law otherwise provides that applicants are
evaluated on a case-by-case basis.74 The per se adoption ban
64. See id. § 409.175(5)(a) (listing criteria for operation of foster homes and
omitting sexual orientation of potential foster parents).
65. See id. § 409.175(5)(a)(2), .175(5)(a)(8).
66. See id. § 409.175(1)(a).
67. See id. § 409.175(5)(a)(5).
68. See Talia Cohen, Protecting or Dismantling the Family: A Look at Foster
Families and Homosexual Parents After Lofton v. Kearney, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
RTS. L. REV. 227, 245 (2003) (highlighting the clear and unequivocal endorsement




72. See Turbe, supra note 43, at 385.
73. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West Supp. 2005); see also Petition for
Writ of Certiorari at 3, Lofton v. Sec'y of the Fla. Dep't of Children & Families,
2004 WL 2289198 (U.S.) (No. 04-478) (explaining that all nonhomosexual adoption
petitions are evaluated on a case-by-case basis, considering foremost the needs of
each child).
74. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.125 (listing factors that must be considered in the
final home investigation, including "[a]ny other information relevant to the
suitability of the intended adoptive home"); Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children
& Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 821 n.18 (11th Cir. 2004) reh'g en banc denied, 377
F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005); Petition for Cert. at
[Vol. 23:407
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disallows DCF from merely considering homosexuality as a factor
in the placement decision.7 5 Instead, Florida categorically removes
homosexuals from the adoptive parent pool before gay and lesbian
families have the opportunity to be considered by DCF. Ironically,
homosexuals are "the very people which the State frequently relies
upon to provide [foster care] ."76
It is important to understand how the Eleventh Circuit
defines "homosexuals" with respect to the adoption ban. The
Florida statute explicitly denies eligibility to adopt to any person
who is "homosexual," but does not define the term.7 7 The Lofton
court noted that the law purportedly targets "individuals who
'engage in current, voluntary homosexual activity,"'78 echoing the
language from a Florida state court decision which defined a
homosexual as someone who was "known to engage in current,
voluntary homosexual activity."79 The court finds this definition
important because it demonstrates that the law is directed at an
activity, rather than targeting an identity.8 0
III. The Equal Protection Clause Has Historically Protected
Politically Unpopular Groups
The Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution
demands that "no person shall be denied the equal protection of
the law."8' If a law being challenged involves a class but neither
burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, the law
will generally be upheld "so long as it bears a rational relation to
3.
75. But see Carolyn S. Grigsby, Lofton v. Kearney: Discrimination Declared
Constitutional in Florida, 21 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REV. 199, 228-29 (2002) (arguing
that the best interests of the child standard could include sexual orientation as a
factor in rare cases). Gays and lesbians face'discrimination in adoption even in the
absence of total bans. See Molly Cooper, What Makes a Family? Addressing the
Issue of Gay and Lesbian Adoption, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 178, 182 (2004) (surveying
state adoption laws and decisions which limit but do not ban entirely adoptions by
gays and lesbians); Erica Gesing, The Fight to Be a Parent: How Courts Have
Restricted the Constitutional-Based Challenges Available to Homosexuals, 38 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 841, 850 (2004) (pointing out that the discretionary nature of the best
interests of the child standard may prevent gays and lesbians from adopting "if the
judge is not willing to accept the concept of the evolving definition of family").
76. Turbe, supra note 43, at 391.
77. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3).
78. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 827 (panel) (quoting Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative
Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210, 1215 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)).
79. Cox, 627 So. 2d at 1215.
80. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 827 (panel).
81. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
20051
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some legitimate end."8 2  Many gay and lesbian legal advocates
argue that homosexuals are a suspect class,8 3 although few courts
have agreed.8 4 Similarly, others argue that the privacy rights
surrounding gays and lesbians are fundamental rights that
deserve stricter scrutiny than mere rational basis.8 5 Even under a
deferential rational basis standard, a court will inquire into the
relationship between the statutory classification and the
government's interest.8 6 Under this standard, a law is "sustained
if it can be said to advance a legitimate government interest, even
if the law seems unwise or works to the disadvantage of a
particular group. 8 7 The presence of a rational basis in any law is
important because it serves to "ensure that classifications are not
drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by
the law."88 If a law carries the pretext of legitimately targeting an
82. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
83. See, e.g., Eric A. Roberts, Heightened Scrutiny Under the Equal Protection
Clause: A Remedy to Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation, 42 DRAKE L.
REV. 485 (1993) (arguing for the applicability of heightened scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause as a remedy to the invidious discrimination gays have
experienced); cf. Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and
Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994) (arguing that
discriminatory statutes deserve heightened scrutiny because they are directed at
one's gender and therefore should be afforded intermediate scrutiny).
84. See Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d
289, 292 n.1 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that neither suspect nor quasi-suspect class is
burdened by amendment to Cincinnati's charter removing homosexuals from the
protection of antidiscrimination ordinances); Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat'l Guard, 124
F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 1997) (assuming "homosexuals do not constitute a suspect
or quasi-suspect class" in upholding the military's "don't ask, don't tell" policy);
Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 928-29 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that no suspect
classification is implicated by "don't ask, don't tell"); High Tech Gays v. Def. Indust.
Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573-34 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that
homosexuals meet one but not all of the criteria of suspect or quasi-suspect classes);
Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 724-28 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., concurring)
(finding homosexuals a suspect class).
85. See EVAN GERSTMANN, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE CONSTITUTION 67-98
(2004) (surveying cases involving marriage and finding a constitutionally protected
fundamental right to marry that includes the right to marry one's same-sex
partner); Edward Stein, Introducing Lawrence v. Texas: Some Background and a
Glimpse of the Future, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 263, 275-80 (2004) (suggesting
that Lawrence v. Texas strengthens the argument for a fundamental right to marry
for gays and lesbians).
86. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.
87. Id. But see Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 377
F.3d 1275, 1292 (11th Cir. 2004) (Barkett, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing
en banc) (arguing that a more searching form of rational basis has been used in
cases involving personal relationships, such as Lawrence), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct.
869 (2005).
88. Romer, 517 U.S. at 633; see also R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 181
(1980) (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that a law's impartiality is suspect if the
apparent aim of the legislature is the adverse impact on a disfavored class).
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activity, but is designed to harm a particular class of people, the
law is considered to be the product of animus and is
unconstitutional.8 9
Some courts use equal protection analysis in cases of sexual
orientation-based discrimination. 90 In Romer v. Evans,91 the
Supreme Court employed the Equal Protection Clause to strike
down a state constitutional amendment in Colorado that
discriminated against homosexuals. 92  While some argue the
holding in Romer is particular to a finding of animus, 93 others see
the field of equal protection, and how it applies to gays and
lesbians, as yet underdetermined. 94 After the Supreme Court's
ruling in Lawrence v. Texas, questions remain about whether such
a positive outcome for gay and lesbian rights under due process
will affect equal protection jurisprudence. 95 Justice O'Connor's
concurrence in Lawrence gives hope to those wanting to utilize the
Equal Protection Clause as a tool to end discrimination based on
sexual orientation. She argues that the constitutionality of the
89. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (striking down facially
neutral law prohibiting laundries made out of wood as discriminatory against
Chinese laundries).
90. See Ann M. Reding, Lofton v. Kearney: Equal Protection Mandates Equal
Adoption Rights, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1285, 1296 n.84 (collecting cases on the
Equal Protection Clause as applied to homosexuals); Stein, supra note 85, at 282-88
(examining current litigation with respect to sexual orientation and the
accompanying equal protection arguments in light of Lawrence).
91. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
92. See id at 635-36.
93. See Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804,
826-27 (11th Cir. 2004), reh'g en banc denied, 377 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2004), cert.
denied, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005); Lofton v. Kearney, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1385 (S.D.
Fla. 2001), affd, 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004).
94. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Destabilizing Due Process and Evolutive
Equal Protection, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1183, 1217 (2000) (arguing that greater
political power on the part of gays and lesbians may lead the Supreme Court to
strike down some discriminatory laws); Gesing, supra note 75, at 841 (arguing the
impact of Romer is still unclear and that homosexuals may end up being deemed a
suspect class entitled to equal protection); Lofton v. Kearney, 115 HARV. L. REV.
1259, 1259 (2002) (noting that the court's analysis "avoided considering the
ramifications of its broad reading of Romer"); Stein, supra note 85, at 282 (arguing
that Lawrence does not address the validity of an equal protection challenge to
sexual orientation discrimination).
95. Compare Andrew Koppelman, Lawrence's Penumbra, 88 MINN. L. REV.
1171, 1180 (2004) (arguing the one clear rule that emerges from Lawrence is that
"if a state singles out gays for unprecedentedly harsh treatment the Court will
presume that what is going on is a bare desire to harm, rather than mere moral
disapproval" (emphasis omitted)), with Mary Anne Case, Of "This" and "That" in
Lawrence v. Texas, 2003 Sup. CT. REV. 75 (explaining that the potential of
Lawrence as a progressive text is difficult to predict because the opinion is filled
with ambiguity and that any effort to declare a certain aspect of the decision as
definitive is premature).
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sodomy law at issue would best be decided on equal protection
grounds.96 Importantly, some argue that Lawrence signifies the
end of morality-based legislation, the sort of lawmaking which
often treats homosexuals differently than heterosexuals. 97
IV. The Disparate Treatment of Homosexuals in the Florida
Adoption Statute Is Unconstitutional and Can Only Be
Explained by Animus
A. The Florida Statute Is Not Rational Because It Is Both
Underinclusive and Overinclusive
Florida's adoption law casts too wide a net over gays and
lesbians while simultaneously ignoring many categories of people
that pose direct harm to children. In other words, the law is both
too overinclusive and too underinclusive to be rationally related to
the legitimate interest articulated by the state of Florida. The
only possible reason to exclude homosexuals from the process of
adoption is the very reason Florida first proffered in the district
court's hearing of Lofton: to convey its disapproval of
homosexuals. 98 Animus of this kind is unconstitutional. 99
A state law banning all homosexuals from applying for
adoption, without consideration of any other criteria, is
overinclusive because it defines, and makes assumptions about, a
class of people based on a single characteristic. 10 0 Unmarried
96. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
97. See id. at 589-90 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Lawrence
majority stands to undermine the proposition that a governing body's sense of
morality is a rational basis for regulating a certain class); Nan D. Hunter, Living
with Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1129 (2004) (arguing that Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion is good news for gay rights advocates because it goes
a step further than Romer by claiming that "[mioral disapproval of a group cannot
be a legitimate governmental interest" (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 2486
(O'Connor, J., concurring)). But see Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-Based
Justifications for Lawmaking: Before and After Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L.
REV. 1234 n.8 (2004) (noting that a conservative reading of Lawrence would limit
its reach to restrictions on "the conduct of private, consensual, noncommercial
sexual relationships between two adults"); Stein, supra note 85, at 281 (finding
Justice Scalia's concerns about morality possibly well founded, but that the slope is
not so slippery because it has a stopping point with respect to consent and third
party harms).
98. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
100. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Lofton v. Sec'y of the Fla. Dep't. of
Children & Families, 2004 WL 2289198 (U.S.) (No. 04-478) (explaining how
Florida's law conclusively treats all members of the class as inherently unfit,
without making an inquiry into individual ability, family ties to the child, or any
other circumstances); Bell, supra note 62, at 362 (arguing that a strict statutory
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heterosexuals and homosexuals who are in all other ways
similarly situated are not treated equally under Florida's law. 1 1
Single heterosexual applicants are allowed to go through a
screening process while applications from single homosexuals are
denied before any review process even begins. 10 2 The Florida law
does not ask if the homosexual applicant has a criminal history, is
able to provide for the child financially, or has the kind of stable
lifestyle that a child needs while growing up.103 Disqualifications
based on those criteria would be permissible limitations on the
ability of anyone to adopt.10 4 Indeed, when placing a child with an
applicant, it makes sense to exclude a candidate based on that
person's capabilities, home environment, and moral character.105
A blanket exclusion on gay adoption, in the words of one
commentator, "seems to involve a rather straightforward equal
protection violation.''06
Florida's adoption law is akin to the Colorado constitutional
amendment struck down by the Supreme Court in Romer v. Evans.
There, the amendment prohibited homosexuals from having access
to redress if they were discriminated against because of their
sexual identity. 07 Colorado presented two reasons for the law. 0 8
The State argued that the amendment respected other citizens'
freedom of association, and that it conserved resources, allowing
Colorado to fight discrimination against other groups.10 9 The
Court in Romer found the amendment unconstitutional because it
"is at once too narrow and too broad," and "identifies persons by a
prohibition against same-sex couples from adopting is problematic because it
refuses to consider an individual's ability to parent).
101. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
103. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 65C-16.002, .004, .005 (2003); see also
Petition for Cert. at 6 (pointing out Florida doesn't allow for any review of
homosexual applicants on their own merits).
104. Cf. Petition for Cert. at 4 (noting that Florida's statute prohibits the
exclusion of disabled applicants from the adoption process unless the disability
renders them unable to be an effective parent).
105. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
106. Mark Strasser, Adoption, Best Interests, and the Constitution: On Rational
Basis Scrutiny and the Avoidance of Absurd Results, 5 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 297, 299
(2003).
107. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996) (explaining that amendment
precluded all 'legislative, executive, or judicial action at any level of state or local
government designed to protect [the status of persons based on their sexual
orientation]").
108. See id. at 635.
109. Id. at 622.
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single trait and then denies them protection across the board."'110
The court in Lofton responds to Romer by stating that its
"unique factual situation and narrow holding are inapposite to
[the case at hand]." '  The court quickly dismisses the case
without any thorough analysis. 112 The Lofton court opines that
Florida's law does not have as discontinuous a relationship with
its purpose as did the amendment in Romer; however, this
response fails to address the fact that the discontinuity suggests
animus, and this, "not the discontinuity itself, [is what] violate[s]
the Constitution." 3 Although the amendment in Romer targeted
more rights, the statute in Lofton is similarly flawed because
"there is no legitimate rational relationship between Florida's
proffered justifications and its sweeping categorical adoption ban
against homosexuals." 11 4 The degree to which both cases are
overinclusive is significant: in both cases homosexuals are
categorically singled out and denied protection of the law, other
similarly situated minorities are not targeted, and there is ample
evidence that the impetus for the law was moral disapproval of
homosexuality. 115 Under this analysis, the cases are apposite and
the ruling in Romer should have been determinative in Lofton.1 16
The court in Lofton states that it is permissible for Florida to
exclude only homosexuals in such a broad manner because "[i]t is
not irrational to think that heterosexual singles have a markedly
greater probability of eventually establishing a married household
110. Id. at 633.
111. Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 827
(11th Cir. 2004), reh'g en banc denied, 377 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied,
125 S. Ct. 869 (2005).
112. See id. at 826-27.
113. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 23, Lofton v. Sec'y of the Fla. Dep't. of
Children & Families, 2004 WL 2289198 (U.S.) (No. 04-478) (arguing that the Lofton
court fails to address the overinclusive and underinclusive problem in a substantive
manner); see also Lofton, 377 F.3d 1275, 1296-1301 (Barkett, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing emphatically that there is no legitimate
rational relationship between Florida's proffered justifications and its sweeping
categorical adoption ban against homosexuals), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005).
114. Lofton, 377 F.3d at 1296 (Barkett, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
banc).
115. See id. at 1295-1301 (Barkett, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
banc); Timothy P.F. Crowley, Lofton v. Kearney: The United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida Holds Florida's Statutory Ban on Gay Adoption
is Not Offensive to the Constitution, 11 LAW & SEXUALITY 253 (2002) (arguing that
the court was wrong to not find the Florida statute as motivated by animus).
116. See Petition for Cert. at 19-23 (arguing that the Lofton court goes to great
lengths to subvert the ruling in Romer, creating a set of interpretations that would
make the Supreme Court's holdings so narrow that they would be limited only to
the peculiar facts of each decision).
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and, thus, providing their adopted children with a stable, dual-
gender parenting environment."'117 The problem with this logic is
that it does not capture how the law actually operates. Florida
allows heterosexual singles to adopt, demonstrating the fact that
"it is not marriage that guarantees a stable, caring environment
for children but the character of the individual caregiver." 11 Also,
the statute does not contain any preference for married couples." 9
Because neither a heterosexual who has no intention of ever
marrying nor a homosexual who is already married (to someone of
the opposite sex) will be barred from adopting, the statute cannot
possibly be designed "to place children in stable [heterosexual]
homes with two parents."' 20 Instead, the statute is "designed to
preclude gays and lesbians from adopting, interests of the children
notwithstanding."' 21 The Lofton court goes on to say that, even if
heterosexual singles never marry, it is rational to think they "are
better positioned than homosexual individuals to provide adopted
children with education and guidance relative to their sexual
development throughout pubescence and adolescence."' 22  The
117. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 822 (panel).
118. Lofton, 377 F.3d at 1298 (Barkett, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
banc).
119. See id. at 1297-98 (Barkett, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)
(explaining how evaluations of prospective parents are not based on projected
marital status and that Florida does not ask applicants for a commitment of plans
to marry).
120. Strasser, supra note 106, at 307; see also Lofton, at 1297-98 (Barkett, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (pointing out that Florida does not
require heterosexual applicants to disclose future marriage plans or prospects in
order to achieve its proffered objective).
121. Strasser, supra note 106, at 307.
122. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 822 (panel); cf. Lynn D. Wardle, Preference for Marital
Couple Adoption-Constitutional and Policy Reflections, 5 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 345,
377-380 (2003) (arguing that children should be raised by a father and mother and
criticizing studies showing no difference between children raised by heterosexuals
and those raised by homosexuals). But cf. Carlos A. Ball, Lesbian and Gay
Families: Gender Nonconformity and the Implications of Difference, 31 CAP. U. L.
REV. 691, 694, 724-47 (2003) (arguing in part that "the need to avoid gender role
nonconformity and to promote what it takes to be proper gender identity among
children as a justification for prohibiting lesbians and gay men from adopting fails
to pass constitutional muster under the Equal Protection Clause"); Cooper, supra
note 75, at 185 (pointing out that recently the American Academy of Pediatrics
announced its support of co-parent and second-parent adoptions by homosexuals
and that current studies answer conclusively many of the previous criticisms
regarding such adoptions); Kari E. Hong, Parens Patri[archy]." Adoption, Eugenics,
and Same-Sex Couples, 40 CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 57-59 (2003) (arguing research does
not support a link between having heterosexual parents and "traditional gender
roles"); Charlotte J. Patterson, Adoption of Minor Children by Lesbian and Gay
Adults: A Social Science Perspective, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POLy 191, 205 (1995)
(noting that social science research shows that "the sexual orientation of adoptive
parents should be considered irrelevant"); Judith Stacey & Timothy J. Biblarz,
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Lofton decision boils down to the court's belief that the law is
rational because the awkward and emotional experience of
heterosexual development would be foreign to gay people who
could not appropriately guide a teenager through such a period. 123
With this misguided assumption, the Lofton court completely
avoids a thorough analysis of the means and ends, and instead
injects its own dogma.124 Here, the court also fails to address the
fact that, as foster parents throughout the state of Florida, gays
and lesbians are already effectively raising children during their
teenage years. 125
The Florida law is also underinclusive because the law's
proposed aim is to protect the best interests of the child, but
homosexuals are the only category specifically targeted in this
effort.' 26  The Florida law does not provide for a blanket
disqualification of any other category of persons.127 It does not, for
instance, categorically disqualify substance abusers or people with
a history of domestic violence. 128 Florida administers a special
review process to consider the applicants who have a history of
mistreating children and does not categorically deny them the
privilege of adoption. 129 To better achieve the purported goal of
finding parents who are in the best interests of the child, the law
might categorically exclude those who have a criminal history, a
record of child neglect or abuse, or those who have been denied
access to the foster care system, rather than homosexuals. 130
(How) Does the Sexual Orientation of Parents Matter?, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 159, 176-
79 (2001) (refuting the claim that there are no differences between the children of
heterosexual parents and children of gay parents but endorsing the view that social
science research provides no ground for taking sexual orientation into account with
respect to parental rights).
123. See Lofton, 358 F.3d at 822 (panel).
124. See Lofton, 377 F.3d at 1299-1300 (Barkett, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc) (arguing that not only is the argument that gays will not know
how to talk to their kids about puberty ridiculous, but that it is akin to preventing
a white family from adopting a black child or an American family from adopting an
immigrant child).
125. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30.
126. See supra Part II.
127. See supra note 74 and accompanying text; cf. Strasser, supra note 106, at
300 (pointing out that the policy permits singles to adopt even though the state
justifies barring certain unmarried couples from the adoption process based on a
preference for marriage).
128. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63 (West Supp. 2005); Petition for Writ of Certiorari
at 5, Lofton v. Sec'y of the Fla. Dep't of Children & Families, 2004 WL 2289198
(U.S.) (No. 04-478).
129. See Petition for Cert. at 5.
130. See id. (explaining how the Florida law allows individuals with a history of
substance abuse, and even child abuse, an opportunity to be considered as adoptive
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While legislatures can deal with problems in a piecemeal fashion,
the law must still be constitutional and not be the product of
animus.
B. The Florida Law Is Not Rational Because It Is Not in the
Best Interests of Children
Contrary to its position on adoption, Florida permits
homosexuals to be foster parents and legal guardians. 13 1 Florida
state law also employs the best interests of the child standard to
govern its operations with respect to foster care. 132  The
Department of Children & Families places children in homosexual
foster homes every year under the understanding that children
will have a caring and stable foundation in these homes.133 Yet,
Florida maintains that homosexual parents do not meet the best
interests of the state's children who are up for adoption. 3 4 This
inconsistency between the foster care system and the adoption
system is irrational because the two operations serve similar
purposes and often work hand-in-hand. 135  Because Florida
prevents adoptions by gays and lesbians "even where the
adoptions would promote the best interests of children, the state's
commitment to bettering children's lives is open to question."'
36
Not granting adoption rights, which are legally greater parental
rights than foster care rights, to gays and lesbians can only be
explained by animus towards homosexuals.137
parents).
131. See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
133. In some cases, foster agencies acknowledge the superiority of gay and
lesbian families as foster parents. See Gesing, supra note 75, at 855-56 (noting that
"various foster agencies have made special efforts to place homosexual children, as
well as those struggling with issues of their sexuality, in gay and lesbian foster
homes," and that this practice has increased after many homosexual foster children
were ridiculed or punished by their heterosexual foster families).
134. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
135. See Turbe, supra note 43, at 384-90 (explaining that Florida applies the
best interests of the child standard to all proceedings involving child welfare,
except for when homosexuals would like to adopt, and that this inconsistency is
purely discriminatory).
136. Strasser, supra note 106, at 300; see also Grigsby, supra note 75, at 225
(suggesting that anti-homosexual policies are not in the child's best interests);
Nicole Sheppe, Georgia's Children on Our Minds..., 55 MERCER L. REV. 1415,
1450 (2004) (pointing out that preventing homosexual adoptions by both parents
may not be in the best interests of the child because a nonrecognized parent would
not be subject to duties like child support).
137. Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.032(2) (West Supp. 2005) with id. §
409.175(2)(e) (defining "adoption" and "family foster home" respectively and
describing some of the legal rights that accompany those terms).
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John Doe's experience with Florida's adoption system is not
unique. 138 Children who are not immediately able to enter the
adoption process are first put in foster care. 139  Often, these
children have special needs. 140 "In the years between 1986 and
1996, reports indicate that... [o]f those children lucky enough to
be adopted, 65% of them were adopted from former foster care
parents."'141 Furthermore, about "25,000 children leave the foster
care system every year, not because they have been adopted out,
but rather because they have been 'aged out of the system' when
they reach the age of 18."142 At the time Steven Lofton sought
review of the Eleventh Circuit's decision, he and his partner had
been foster parents to John Doe for thirteen years 143 but were
denied the ability to adopt him. After years of developing a close
and stable relationship with their foster son,' 44 they could do
nothing if the state decided to take Doe away and place him with
heterosexual parents. Organizations involved with children's
issues have lamented the irrationality of these inconsistent
policies.145
The court in Lofton claims the difference afforded to the
foster care system is permissible because "foster care and
guardianship have neither the permanence nor the societal,
cultural, and legal significance as does adoptive parenthood."' 46
This reasoning, however, ignores what is actually happening to
Florida's children, whose interests are supposedly being protected
by the law. 147  The court's approval of the state's irrational
judgment on the moral acceptability of certain households reflects
a failure to consider the emotional needs and interests of Florida's
children. 148 "The pretextual nature of [Florida's] presumptions is
138. See supra Part I.
139. See Cooper, supra note 75, at 181 (noting that the current system places
"hard-to-place" children in the foster care system).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 180.
142. Id.
143. Petition for Cert. at 8; Nieves, supra note 29.
144. Lofton v. Kearney, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1379 (S.D. Fla. 2001), affd, 358
F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004).
145. See Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, supra note 16.
146. Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 824
(11th Cir. 2004).
147. See Strasser, supra note 106, at 307 (arguing Florida claims that it wants to
promote stability for children and place them in homes that are in their best
interests, but that the state's actions suggest that its real commitment is to
something else); supra notes 132-134 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 132-134 and accompanying text.
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supported by the substantial gap between [its] antigay policy and
the best interests of the child, which suggests that hysteria about
or obsession with fantasized gay predation still underlies the
policies." 149  This is "precisely the problem found
unconstitutionally irrational" in Romer. 150
The disparity of the two systems is suspicious because of the
differing legal value accorded each privilege. In effect, the state of
Florida is recognizing a limited legal right for a certain category of
persons while denying them broader rights, all the while using the
same standard to determine eligibility in either category. The
state, not wanting to grant legal parental rights to gays and
lesbians, but desperately needing foster homes, denies legal
parental rights to gays while simultaneously employing them as
parents to take care of Florida's foster children. 51 These are the
precise makings of animus. When the state establishes a pretext
for the purpose of wanting to harm a minority, the state operates
under animus. 152 The Lofton court is wrong to gloss over the
disparity in the system and seems to do so because a thorough
analysis would demonstrate that the rationale proffered for the
law is irrational.
C. The Florida Law Is Not Rational Because It Is Directed at
Homosexuality as an Identity Rather than at Homosexual
Activity
The final problem with the Lofton court's analysis is the way
it discusses the difference between homosexual conduct and
homosexual identity. In an apparent effort to distance the case at
hand from Romer, the court in Lofton argues that the Florida law
is permissible in comparison to Colorado's amendment, because it
is directed at homosexual conduct and not status.153 The court's
distinction, that the law is permissible because it targets only
those who participate in homosexual conduct and not those who
149. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW 213 (1999).
150. Id.
151. Cf. Hong, supra note 122, at 38 (arguing the goal of some legislators in
enacting bans on gay adoption is to administer a preemptive strike against gay
marriage, because many consider the right of gay marriage to be naturally
conferred to gay families that have the right to legally adopt children).
152. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 149, at 213 (arguing that "[a]ny effort by the
state to use children to make a symbolic statement of animus against gay people is
more vicious than the [Romer] initiative, unless a parent's sodomy can be cogently
tied to the child's best interests by a nonhysterical, nonnarcissistic, nonobsessional
chain of factual reasoning").
153. See supra notes 78-80.
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identify as homosexual, is quite meaningless. 154 The court seems
to be suggesting that a homosexual who does not practice
homosexual activities could be an adoptive parent, or at least
would not be within the class of people distinguished in Florida's
law.155 As a threshold matter, it is not workable to demand
celibacy from a potential homosexual applicant in exchange for a
child. More importantly, the court's distinction does not match the
actual application of the law.
When participating in Florida's adoption process, an
applicant is required to check a box that states whether or not she
or he is a homosexual. 56 If the box is checked, then DCF
automatically denies the application. 15 7 Surprisingly, the adoption
form does not have a box for a nonpracticing homosexual. 58 To
the dismay of anyone interested in participating in a "don't ask,
don't tell" adoption policy, it appears the law targets homosexuals
based on homosexual identity, regardless of sexual activities.' 59
Furthermore, house visits required for adoption candidates work
to deny homosexuals access to adoption rights, even if they lied
about their sexual identity in order to adopt.16 0
The act of punishing an identity with the pretext of only
punishing an activity is a standard equal protection problem and
represents the exact ingredients of animus.' 16 Interestingly, the
Eleventh Circuit goes to great lengths to demonstrate that Florida
154. See Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., v. Cox, 627 So. 2d, 1210, 1215
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (recognizing that the distinction between homosexual
orientation and homosexual activity is unreasonable because the activity is nothing
more than the mere expression of the orientation); see also Lofton v. Sec'y of the
Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 377 F.3d 1275, 1299 (11th Cir. 2004) (Barkett,
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (pointing out that Lawrence v.
Texas makes the distinction in Florida's law impermissible), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct.
869 (2005).
155. See Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804,
827 (11th Cir. 2004), reh'g en banc denied, 377 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2004), cert.
denied, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005).
156. See Fla. Dep't of Children & Families, CF-FSP 5071, Adoptive Home
Application (2003), http://www.dcf.state.fl.us/publications/eforms/fsp5071.pdf (last
visited Mar. 3, 2005) [hereinafter Adoptive Home Application]; supra notes 33-34
and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
158. See Adoptive Home Application, supra note 156.
159. See Strasser, supra note 106, at 300-01.
160. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Lofton v. Sec'y of the Fla. Dep't of
Children & Families at 11, 2004 WL 2289198 (U.S.) (No. 04-478) (explaining the
factual history of Doug Houghton, a co-plaintiff, who experienced a favorable home
study but then had the evaluator tell him that, by law, he was not qualified to
adopt the child of whom he was the legal guardian).
161. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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is not punishing homosexual identity.162 The court simply proves
too much. Its awkward awareness of its own bigotry is akin to
Justice Scalia's claim in his Lawrence dissent-neither claim to
have anything against gay people exercising some limited set of
rights, they just don't want them to have the same protection of
the law that heterosexuals do.163 Instead, "Florida's ban is better
described as a 'status-based enactment' potentially 'divorced from
any factual context' than a valid exercise in governance. 1 64
Even if the identity/activity distinction and justification is
accepted, the Lofton court does not address the fact that it is not
constitutional after Lawrence to criminalize homosexual
activity. 65 While the court argues under a due process analysis
that Lawrence does not guarantee a fundamental right to sodomy,
this does not respond to the problem that the Florida statute is
denying a privilege to a single category of persons based solely on
their practice of a legal activity. After Lawrence, this is
unacceptable. Even if Lawrence does not represent the end to all
"morality" legislation,' 66 it certainly does not allow the government
to disadvantage people engaging in a constitutionally protected
practice.
If the state desires to target a class of people and deny that
class rights based on a specific legal activity, then Florida needs to
deny adoption privileges to all of those who practice sodomy,
homosexual or heterosexual. Justice O'Connor's concurrence in
Lawrence should be instructive to the court in Lofton.16 7 Under
that analysis, a discriminatory law that is only directed at
homosexuals and not heterosexuals, even though both groups
practice the same activity, violates the Equal Protection Clause. 68
Justice O'Connor invokes the basic tenet of the Equal Protection
Clause that the Lofton court cannot seem to fathom-that the
Constitution "neither knows nor tolerates classes among
citizens."169
162. See Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804,
827 (11th Cir. 2004).
163. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 603 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
164. Crowley, supra note 115, at 264 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623
(1996)).
165. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (Texas has no right to criminalize private,
consensual, sexual conduct among adults).
166. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
167. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
169. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 584 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Plessy v.




Steven Lofton should be granted the same rights as any
heterosexual citizen of Florida who is capable and deserving
enough to raise an adopted child. He and other gay persons
should be allowed to apply to be adoptive parents, be subject to the
scrutiny of the Department of Children & Familes, and be granted
the right to adopt their foster children if an evaluation shows they
meet state standards. The plaintiffs in Lofton are not asking for
special rights or considerations. Steven Lofton and thousands of
other gays and lesbians are asking to be treated like their
heterosexual friends and neighbors. Most importantly, the best
interests of Florida's children are served if gays and lesbians are
afforded equal rights.
The court in Lofton is wrong in finding the Florida adoption
ban constitutional. By employing a test that goes far beyond
deferential rational basis review, the court tacitly approves of the
animus that led to the enactment of Florida's adoption law. In
doing so, the court ignores the inexcusable gap between the law's
means and ends, ignores the disparity between the foster care and
adoption systems, and ignores the thin pretext that serves as a
justification for animus. These errors are too blatant to be
excusable.
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